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ABSTRACT
Current contributions from public and philanthropic sources, while significant, are
insufficient to finance global fisheries reform. Private capital markets are a largely
untapped resource that many argue can help support and sustain sustainable fish-
eries management. This paper explores this topic by analyzing the challenges and
opportunities facing conservation finance, a growing industry seeking to balance
financial returns with improvements to local environmental, economic, and social
conditions. Using open access fisheries as context, we present the first application
of a bioeconomic model to inform conservation finance for fisheries. We identify
three strategies described by the conservation finance industry and evaluate their
capacity to generate financial returns and to promote positive triple bottom-line
impacts. Our model suggests that, in order for conservation finance to be effec-
tive, strong fisheries governance must first be established. If governance is not
established, then conservation finance is faced with a perverse incentive in which
a conservation finance project can generate value and increase employment while
depleting the stock biomass. The results also suggest a tradeoff between envi-
ronmental and social outcomes for fisheries operating at open access: in order to
promote the recovery of the fish stock, fishing effort must be reduced. This conflicts
with the stated goals of conservation finance and the broader sustainable develop-
ment community to promote sustainable natural resource use without impacting
the livelihoods of local stakeholders.
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CHAPTER 1
INTRODUCTION
Despite a rich literature on optimal resource management, over-fishing remains
a key threat to the survival of coastal communities and the function of marine
ecosystems [54, 91]. Fisheries support the employment of millions worldwide and
are critical to the food security of countless others [29]; yet poor management
continues to drive many stocks towards collapse [37, 91]. When combined with
other challenges like habitat loss and global climate change, some have concluded
that the future of fisheries is bleak [60].
Nevertheless, recent work seeking to quantify the gains from healthy global
fisheries present a compelling case for reform: healthier ecosystems, larger harvests,
and more efficient harvesting behavior could bring billions of dollars in increased
profits to the seafood industry [21,89]. At the same time, a growing number of case
studies provide evidence that efficient policy design can lead to local improvements
to the biological, economic, and social conditions in fisheries around the world
[11, 23, 38, 72]. And while reform is expensive, estimates suggest that, in the long
run, the benefits could far outweigh the costs [79].
Often missing from these discussions, however, is the financing necessary to
bring about and sustain desired changes in fisheries management. When available,
public funds are used to support the monitoring, enforcement, and implementation
necessary for successful management or to provide financial support for fishers who
need to develop a new business model, purchase more sustainable fishing gear, or
pursue an entirely new livelihood [52, 79]. But in many fisheries, such public
support is either not available or is used to subsidize the fishing industry without
consideration of sustainability [19, 79] .
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As a result, non-government actors have become increasingly important as
both capital providers and, more generally, as catalysts for change [31]. Citing the
inability of many governments to prevent the decline of global fisheries, private
foundations, Non-Governmental Organizations (NGO’s), seafood wholesalers, gro-
cery retailers, and others with an interest in sustainable seafood have effectively
established their own set of tools for engaging stakeholders and influencing fisheries
governance [69]. These range from assistance in the design and implementation
of improved management institutions (e.g. Environmental Defense Fund’s Catch
Share Design Manual), attempts at leveraging the supply chain to generate demand
for sustainable seafood (e.g. Marine Stewardship Council), and the provision of
concessionary financing to stakeholders [31].
But many argue that these contributions are still insufficient to rebuild global
fisheries [13, 65]. In fact, although the financing gap has not been directly quan-
tified, estimates of the costs of global fisheries reform dwarf current philanthropic
contributions: between 2010 and 2015, the combined contributions from philan-
thropic sources and from ocean-related official development assistance totaled $4.3
billion [15]; global estimates for the costs of reducing fishing effort to optimal levels
(only a portion of the true costs of reform) range from $100 - $300 billion [80,92].
Private capital markets are one of the few untapped large resources that might
be able to provide financing at the scale necessary to make meaningful progress
towards filling the financing gap [13,65]. Of particular interest is the growing field
of conservation finance, where private capital is used to support local improve-
ments to environmental, social, or economic (the so-called “triple bottom-line””)
conditions while also generating financial returns to capital providers [42]. Provid-
ing a platform through which philanthropic and private capital might be blended
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together and leveraged to finance change, conservation finance has attracted the
interest of a wide variety of capital providers and, in some cases, helped to es-
tablish partnerships between foundations, NGOs, investment banks, and impact
investors [42,43,56,90].
To date, however, conservation finance has had comparatively little impact on
seafood. Of the $5 billion in private capital committed to support sustainable
food and fiber production between 2004 and 2015, only $28 million (0.5%) was
invested in promoting sustainable fisheries [34]. Despite a need for capital and
the development of blueprints for investment in natural resources [27, 78], too
few fisheries-related projects have been able to present a salable business case for
return-seeking investors. Although the long-run benefits of sustainable fisheries
might exceed the costs, the costs will likely come far before the benefits can be
monetized by either the fishing industry or by capital providers. As a result, the
market remains largely undeveloped [85].
The purpose of this paper is to gain further insight into the challenges and op-
portunities facing conservation finance for fisheries. Starting with a review of the
current challenges facing global fisheries, we then consider the strategies proposed
by conservation finance practitioners for solving these challenges. In particular, we
seek to understand if these strategies can satisfy both the financial requirements of
return-seeking capital providers while also maintaining or improving the environ-
mental, social, and economic conditions in a fishery operating at the open access
equilibrium. To approach these questions, we develop a bioeconomic model of a
fishery that simulates the behavior of a profit maximizing fishing fleet. Then we
use the model to compare three strategies for sustainable value generation: (1) an
increase in the post-harvest market value of fish, (2) the implementation of a range
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of optimized fishery management plans to promote stock recovery as fast as pos-
sible and (3) the implementation of gradual fishery management in which harvest
price is determined by environmental outcomes. We evaluate the results based on
financial outcomes and triple-bottom line impact by comparing stock size relative
to maximum sustainable yield, the change in number of vessels operating, and the
total profits generated at the end of a reasonable investment period. This paper
contributes to the literature by providing the first application of a bioeconomic
model to conservation finance for natural resource management. Although this
stylized model does not represent any specific fishery, the insights from this paper
can help practitioners and fishery scientists to better understand the potential of
the conservation finance industry.
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CHAPTER 2
CONSERVATION FINANCE FOR FISHERIES
2.1 Current Problems in Fisheries Management
The decline of global fisheries as a result of overfishing and exploitation of the ma-
rine environment is well documented [44, 50, 91]. Along with causing the decline
of target fish stocks, fishing activity can incur additional environmental costs such
as by-catch [24, 35], habitat destruction [36, 63, 64], and impacts on the broader
trophic organization of ecosystems [53, 59]. Degraded fisheries and habitat even-
tually incur social and economic costs on fishing communities. Low catch per
unit effort, low processing yields, product waste, and poor access to high value
markets all undermine the ability of stakeholders to leverage fishing into secure
livelihoods [3, 74,86,89].
A growing number of fish stocks are in the process of restoration and are no
longer over-fished [22, 38]. But in doing so, some fisheries have failed to balance
environmental objectives with economic and social outcomes [6]. To achieve success
across the triple bottom-line, fisheries need sustainably managed resource stocks
supporting profitable harvest and processing businesses that are integrated with
and support local communities [6,26,33]. Accordingly, pursuit of a triple bottom-
line notion of sustainability has started to reshape the priorities of governments,
private firms, foundations, and other social interest groups working to promote a
holistic approach to ocean health [1].
A single model certainly could not address the wide range problems facing
global fisheries. To narrow the scope, we focus specifically on fisheries operating
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at open access, where no management institutions or agreements govern fishing
behavior, as the motivating context. Open access conditions produce a problem
for common-pool resources like fisheries. Faced with a rival but non-excludable
resource, economic theory suggests that fishermen will compete with one another
until the economic profits of harvesting are driven to zero. These conditions will
drive inefficient levels of fishing effort, overinvestment in productive capital and,
in many cases, overexploited fish stocks [30]. Although true open access fisheries
are uncommon, fishers subject to poorly enforced regulations or whose activities
are unmonitored can behave as if they were under open access. Evidence from
fisheries operating under such conditions tend to follow theoretical expectations
for open access resource use [45,49,51,68,81].
This is particularly relevant to fisheries in developing countries, where the in-
frastructure, regulations, or institutions necessary for effective governance might
not exist [9, 69, 87]. In some cases, fishing is an occupation of last resort in which
resource dependent, marginalized communities struggle with poverty and malnu-
trition. Fishery improvements must strike a delicate balance between supporting a
vulnerable fishing community and recovering a potentially collapsed fish stock [3].
Given that roughly half of all seafood entering international markets comes from
developing countries [29], open access fisheries present an important and relevant is-
sue for sustainable seafood. It is, therefore, reasonable to believe that fisheries with
these characteristics are plausible targets for conservation finance. Not only are the
environmental, social, and economics needs significant but, without changes, these
fisheries will likely continue to decline towards the open access equilibrium [30].
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2.2 Defining the Role of Conservation Finance in Fisheries
In order to address the problems caused by open access fisheries and other manage-
ment failures, project managers need to gain access to new sources of financing.
In this paper, we are particularly interested in conservation finance as a source
of private capital. In contrast to philanthropic capital or development assistance
funding, private capital engaged in conservation finance operates in a competitive
market: To attract return-seeking capital providers, conservation projects must
meet investor expectations regarding financial returns and investment risk [43].
On the surface, seafood products are valuable, widely traded, and present a
clear case for investment: annual global seafood exports of $148 billion represent
1% of all products traded globally [29]. Current models suggest that rising global
incomes and population growth will continue to drive strong demand and support
high seafood prices [83, 88]. And, as mentioned in a previous section, sustainable
and efficient management of fisheries could bring billions in additional profits to
the global seafood industry [89]. But international seafood markets are complex,
involving hundreds of commercially important species sourced through long, frag-
mented supply chains [5]. Furthermore, unlike most other sources of protein, wild
capture fisheries exist in the context of a broader ecosystem, making their profits
sensitive to natural fluctuations in the environment [73]. Under open access con-
ditions, these systemic risks add an additional layer of complexity to the perverse
incentives already facing fishermen.
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Strategies for Generating Value
With these risks as context, conservation finance deals must generate value for both
stakeholders and capital providers. Holmes et al. [39], suggest that investment can
be channeled towards the following drivers of increased value: the health of the
fish stock, the operational efficiency of fishing activity, and the market value of
harvest. The few case studies of proposed or existing conservation finance projects
generally follow this framework. They exhibit investments in improved technology
for regulation enforcement [27], fishing quota to reduce fishing effort [27, 52], pro-
cessing plants for sustainably sourced seafood [27,82], and distribution/marketing
companies with access to international sustainable seafood markets [27,52,82].
To reflect these different approaches to value generation, we model three inter-
ventions in this paper.
Intervention 1: Increase in post-harvest value
The first intervention simulates the capture of increased market value post-harvest.
This could reflect a number of different strategies that occur outside of the har-
vesting sector such as an investment in marketing efforts, distribution timing, or
processing quality [69]. All else equal, higher marketing or processing margins and
broader market access would increase the demand for fish, driving up dockside
prices [41]. This approach is particularly relevant for impoverished communities
characterized with poor economic or social conditions. Providing market access
and increasing revenues from fishing might generate important improvements to
lives of stakeholders without the costs of reforming management.
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Intervention 2: Optimal Management Reform
The second intervention for value generation is management reform. There are
a wide range of possible management reforms that, if implemented and enforced,
would change the incentives faced by fishers. A significant portion of fisheries
science and economics has been dedicated to evaluating biological, economic, and
(to a lesser extent) social outcomes associated with these alternatives. Examples
include permit and season limits [40], co-management [32], catch shares [23], indi-
vidual transferable quotas [7], and marine protected areas [48]. For the purposes
of this paper, we follow Anderson & Seijo [8] by aggregating these management
approaches into three broad categories: input controls, output controls, and dedi-
cated access permits (D.A.P.’s). Although economic theory suggests some policies
to be more efficient than others, political and social realities often prevent most
fisheries from pursuing the first-best policy. In fact, many fisheries around the
world exhibit a combination of these three general management types [69].
Intervention 3: Gradual Management Reform and Endogenous Price
The third intervention models value generation through management while also
incorporating both a minimum effort requirement and an endogenously determined
market price. The minimum effort level prevents a complete fishery closure, slowing
the recovery path of a fishery. Although complete fishery closures are, in many
cases, technically optimal, the welfare costs of closure are difficult to measure and
implementation may be unrealistic [17].
An endogenously determined price premium plausibly represents the impact
of an ecological certification scheme on harvest price. These certifications are
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awarded through a rigorous approval process in which fisheries must prove that the
fishery is sustainably managed. In doing so, the certifications serve as a gatekeeper
to premium markets and serve as a monetary incentive for sustainable resource
use. Certification, such as through the Marine Stewardship Council, have also
become the goal for many fisheries improvement projects around the world [69].
Many studies have shown that retail consumers are willing to pay a premium for
sustainable seafood [10,67] and that, in some cases, this can lead to higher dockside
prices [77].
2.3 Characterizing Success and Model Assumptions
In a more realistic setting, project managers would likely blend public, philan-
thropic, and private capital together in order to match the risk preferences of
different capital providers with separate stages of the improvement project [85].
For the purposes of this paper, we take a broader approach and evaluate the perfor-
mance of each intervention against environmental, economic, and social outcomes
- the triple bottom-line. But measuring improvements on the triple bottom-line is
a complex task. Anderson et al. [6], for example, propose 68 different metrics to
measure the environmental, economic, and social conditions of fisheries. For the
sake of simplicity, we will define success with one indicator for each pillar of the
triple bottom-line. These indicators are evaluated at the end of an investment hori-
zon of ten years, which reflects the time preferences of return seeking investors [25].
Although a primary goal of conservation finance is to generate improvements that
will last far into the future, all private financiers will have an exit strategy to limit
risk and to realize investment gains [42]. To account for this, we have chosen a
time horizon that is a common duration for private equity funds, a popular vehicle
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for aggregating private capital for use in conservation finance [42,52,82].
Environmental Improvements
Environmental improvements will be defined as increases in biomass relative to the
open access equilibrium and evaluated by comparison to stock size at maximum
sustainable yield (MSY). This reflects the benchmarks accepted by the scientific
community (e.g. [72]) and matches the stated priorities of the conservation finance
industry. Encourage Capital, L.L.C. (hereafter referred to as Encourage Capital)
defines its ecological objectives as either increasing or preventing further declines in
biomass [27]. Althelia Ecosphere, L.L.P. (hereafter referred to as Althelia) calls for
projects that “involve no net loss of biodiversity” and which “drive conservation of
natural habitats and wild species [4].” The Meloy Fund proposes a slightly more
structured benchmark, stating that the “target species from which the investee
is sourcing [must] have the biological potential for recovery throughout the life
of the investment [82].” Although the Meloy Fund and others utilize MSY as a
reference point, each focuses on broad incremental improvements as the core goal
for interventions.
Social Improvements
We define a social improvement as an increase in the number of vessels operating (a
rough proxy for employment) relative to starting values. Community health is par-
ticularly relevant for conservation finance because projects are critically dependent
upon strong working relationships with local stakeholders. For example, Encour-
age Capital commits itself to improving community resilience (measured through
financial contributions to a community trust), empowering fishing communities
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(measured by the number of fishing communities impacted), and increased meal
production for local and regional consumption or for international export (mea-
sured through projected increases in landing volumes, increases in utilization of
discarded bycatch, and reductions in supply chain spoilage) [27]. The Meloy Fund
focuses on employment and their standards state that the “investee will work to
minimize adverse impacts on . . .employees and all stakeholders [82].” Althelia
takes an even broader approach, requiring simply that all funds support projects
that demonstrate no loss of income or livelihood as a result of the projects use of
land or other resources [4].
Economic/Financial Improvements
Economic improvements will be combined with financial performance. Because
this model does not account for distribution of profits between stakeholders and
capital providers, we assume that the total returns generated by the fishery is also
a measure of the financial performance. Returns will be measured relative to the
gross value of the fishery at open access, simply the total revenues generated by
the fishery. To be successful, it must generate positive net profits by the end of
the investment period. This flexible approach also accounts for the wide-range
of capital providers relevant to the conservation finance industry. Although the
purpose of conservation finance is engage with private capital markets, providers
of grants or concessionary financing that do not require market rate returns play
an important role in conservation finance deals [85].
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CHAPTER 3
METHODS
Bioeconomic models have been used extensively to describe fisheries and other
marine resources under a variety of conditions. Applications include fisheries op-
erating under open access [12, 30, 76] and a variety regulation types [8, 16, 40]; the
derivation of optimal dynamic utilization [18]; the incorporation of spatial connec-
tivity [14,61,70,75]; and the consideration of stochastic environmental or economic
processes [20, 23, 66]. More recently, bioeconomic models have been used to ana-
lyze strategies for rebuilding fish stocks [2, 47] and to estimate the economic and
biological impacts of global fishery management reforms [21,89].
We employ the discrete-time bioeconomic model described by Anderson and
Seijo [8] to simulate a single species fishery at open access. Their stylized approach
is useful in that it explicitly accounts for vessel-level behavior in addition to fish
population dynamics. The profit-maximizing behavior of each vessel serves as the
driver for both the optimization of alternative management strategies as well as for
simulation under open access. Each fisher/vessel owner is identical and operates
in a perfectly competitive market. We assume that the demand for fish is perfectly
elastic, meaning that a change in the amount of fish harvested will not impact
dockside prices. This is a reasonable assumption for a fishery that is a small
supplier for a much larger seafood market.
3.1 Bioeconomic Model Under Open Access
Stock size is determined by Schaefer’s model of density-dependent growth [71]. We
assume that a single fish stock is harvested by identical fishermen where harvest
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is a function of stock size and aggregate fishing effort. Accordingly, the fish stock
is modeled using the following recursive equation:
Xt+1 = Xt + F (Xt)− Y (Xt, ft, vt) (3.1)
where Xt is stock size in year t, F is the natural recruitment function of the
fish stock (Appendix A), and Y is the fishery production function, defining the
relationship between stock size, the number of vessels in the fishing fleet (vt), and
individual vessel effort (ft) in year t. The profits for an individual vessel for a given
year are modeled with the following function:
˜NRt = ργδftXt − δ[αft + βf 2t ]− Φ (3.2)
where ρ is dockside price, γ, α, β are constants, δ is number of days fished, and Φ
is fixed costs. In the absence of regulations, each vessel is free to choose the level
of fishing effort that maximizes profits during each season. We assume that, on
each day fished, vessels operate where marginal revenue from fishing is equal to
the marginal costs of fishing:
ργXt = α + 2βft (3.3)
Solving for the profit-maximizing level of daily effort,
f ∗t =
ργXt − α
2γ
(3.4)
We can then rewrite equation 3.2 using f ∗t :
NRt = ργδf
∗
t Xt − δ[αft + βf ∗2t ]− Φ (3.5)
This assumes that fishing vessels produce the same amount of effort each day over
the course of the year. Or, on average, vessels maximize profits over the course of
the year. Additional details are described in Appendix A.
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New vessels enter the fishery at a rate proportional to vessel profits generated
by the fishery in the previous year. Changes in the size of the fishing fleet are
defined by:
vt+1 = vt + φNR(Xt, f
∗
t ) (3.6)
where φ is a positive constant and NRt is net revenue in period t: To evaluate
the economic outcomes of each intervention, we calculate the net present value of
profits over the investment horizon (T ∗ = 10) using the following equation:
NPVT ∗ =
T ∗∑
t=0
(
1
1 + i
)t
NRtvt (3.7)
where i is the discount rate, NRt is the total profit per vessel in year t, and vt is
the number of vessels operating in the fishery in year t.
3.2 Interventions
Intervention 1: Increase in Post-Harvest Value
In the first intervention, we simulate the impact of an increase in the market value
of fish. As stated in a previous section, one of common strategies proposed by
the conservation finance industry is to capture lost value by investing in the sup-
ply chain [69]. Improvements to the processing, distribution, and marketing of
products from the fishery can generate value by creating higher margin products
and engaging premium markets. This exogenous shift in the perfectly elastic de-
mand curve can be modeled by multiplying the base price parameter by a positive
constant, θ > 1. Individual vessel profits can now be written
NRt = θρqδftXt − δ[αf ∗t + βf ∗2t ]− Φ (3.8)
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Under the new price conditions, the fishery is simulated for the course of the
investment horizon. At the end of the investment horizon, we calculate the net
present value of fleet profits by substituting equation 3.8 into equation 3.7.
Intervention 2: Optimal Management Reform
In the second strategy, we consider an investment in fisheries management reform.
Specifically, we model three management alternatives: input controls on fishing
effort, output controls that identify a total allowable catch per season, and out-
put controls using dedicated access permits (D.A.P.’s). In structuring the model
to consider many different possibilities, our results apply to a broad typology of
fisheries.
Instead of simulating the fishery as under Intervention 1, here we are able
to calculate the optimal dynamic utilization of the fishery for each policy type by
maximizing the net present value of harvesting profits over a finite period (T = 30).
T is chosen to reflect the fact that the goal of conservation finance is to produce
improvements that last far beyond their involvement; however, the results will be
evaluated at the end of the investment horizon, T ∗. A generalized form of the
optimization objective function is
max{NPVT} = max
{
T∑
t=0
(
1
1 + i
)t
NRtvt
}
(3.9)
where i is the discount rate, NRt is the total profit per vessel in year t, and vt is
the number of vessels operating in the fishery in year t. The optimization routines
are described in table 3.1 with additional details provided in Appendix A. At the
end of the investment horizon, we calculate the net present value of fleet profits
utilizing equation 3.7.
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Table 3.1: Intervention 2 Summary
Input Constraint Output Constraint D.A.P.’s
Objective
Maximize Net Present
Value of Harvest
Maximize Net Present
Value of Harvest
Maximize Net Present
Value of Harvest
Control Variable Total Fleet Effort Total Harvest Total Harvest
Constraints
0 ≤ Et ≤ EMSY
X0 ≤ Xt
0 ≤ Yt ≤ YMSY
X0 ≤ Xt
0 ≤ Yt ≤ YMSY
f ∗t = fMIN
X0 ≤ Xt
The key distinctions between each management approach come in the optimiza-
tion constraints, particularly in the mechanisms driving individual fishing effort.
Under each management intervention, we assume that enforcement is perfect, that
harvest must remain below the maximum sustainable yield (YMSY ), and that the
stock size must remain at or above the initial stock size (X0). The optimal daily
fishing effort, occurs where marginal cost equals both marginal revenue and av-
erage cost [7]. Under input or output constraints, there is no mechanism could
maintain individual fishing effort at this level. D.A.P.’s, however, will eventually
achieve this optimal level of effort, regardless of the starting stock size [7]. For the
purposes of optimization, therefore, we assume that vessel owners under D.A.P.’s
operate at both the profit maximizing and cost minimizing levels of fishing effort
at every time period. At the same time, only the optimal number of vessels are al-
lowed to operate in a given period (see Appendix A for details). While this ignores
some of the nuances of D.A.P.’s, the resulting harvest path is the most efficient
solution possible and is sufficient for this analysis.
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Intervention 3: Gradual Management Reform and Endogenous Price
In order to account for potentially high social costs associated with intervention
2, we consider a third, more moderate recovery approach for Intervention 3. Here,
we use the same optimization framework as in Intervention 2 but with two main
differences: (1) a constraint that prevents total fishing effort from falling by more
than 50% from the open access equilibrium (see supplement for details) and (2)
and endogenous price function with the following functional form:
Pt =

ρ Xt < XMSY
ρ(1 + τ) Xt ≥ XMSY
(3.10)
When the stock size is less than stock size at maximum sustainable yield, the
base parameter is used for dockside price. When stock size rises above maximum
sustainable yield, a premium τ > 0 is added to the price. This price premium
is applied to all three of the management reforms described in intervention 2:
input controls, output controls, and dedicated access permits. At the end of the
Table 3.2: Intervention 3 Summary
Input Constraint Output Constraint D.A.P.’s
Objective
Maximize Net Present
Value of Harvest
Maximize Net Present
Value of Harvest
Maximize Net Present
Value of Harvest
Control Variable Total Fleet Effort Total Harvest Total Harvest
Constraints
0 ≤ Yt ≤ YMSY
EBE/2 ≤ Et
X0 ≤ Xt
0 ≤ Yt ≤ YMSY
EBE/2 ≤ Et
X0 ≤ Xt
0 ≤ Yt ≤ YMSY
EBE/2 ≤ Et
f ∗t = fMIN
X0 ≤ Xt
investment horizon, we calculate the net present value of fleet profits utilizing
equation 3.7.
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Model Parameters
The model parameters were chosen using relevant values chosen from the literature
and are displayed in 3.3. Economic parameters are normalized to the ex-vessel price
of fish and biological parameters are normalized to the carrying capacity in order
to maintain generality. The model is initialized at the open access equilibrium,
where Xt+1 = Xt = XOA and vt+1 = vt = vOA. Under the base parameters, stock
size at open access is 29% of natural carrying capacity and 58% of stock size at
maximum sustainable yield. Under these conditions, the fishery is not able to
produce the maximum sustainable yield and is therefore “overfished [58].”
Table 3.3: Parameter Values
Parameter Description Value Source
σ Stock Productivity 0.300 Anderson & Seijo [8]
κ Carrying Capacity 1.000 Anderson & Seijo [8]
ρ Price of Fish 1.000 Anderson & Seijo [8]
γ Catchability Coefficient 5.000x10−5 Anderson & Seijo [8]
α Vertical Intercept of Daily Marginal Cost 0.294 Anderson & Seijo [8]
β Slope of Daily Marginal Cost 0.294 Anderson & Seijo [8]
Φ Fixed Costs 176.471 Anderson & Seijo [8]
δ Number of Days Fished 150.000 Anderson & Seijo [8]
fMAX Maximum Daily Effort 3.200 Anderson & Seijo [8]
fMIN Minimum Daily Effort 2.000 Calculated (Eqn. A.13)
φ Entry/Exit Coefficient 0.002 Bjørndal & Conrad [12]
X0 Initial Stock Size (XOA) 0.294 Calculated (Eqn. A.14)
v0 Initial Fleet Size (vOA) 14.117 Calculated (Eqn. A.15)
XMSY Stock at Maximum Sustainable Yield 0.500 Calculated (Eqn. A.25)
YMSY Maximum Sustainable Yield 0.075 Calculated (Eqn. A.24)
θ Intervention 1 Premium 25% Encourage Capital [27]
τ Intervention 3 Endogenous Multiplier 18% Stemle, Uchida, & Roheim [77]
i Discount Rate 5% World Bank [89]
T ∗ Investment Horizon 10 de Malherbe [25]
T Optimization Horizon 30 By Assumption
Although the model parameters were chosen as representative estimates, global
fisheries are incredibly diverse, particularly in regard to biological characteristics.
The level of stock productivity used in this model is considered “medium produc-
tivity” by Musick [55]. To account for the broad diversity in life history strategies,
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a sensitivity analysis (see Appendix B) has also been conducted for stocks ranging
from “high” to “very low” productivity [55].
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CHAPTER 4
RESULTS
The table below outlines the results at the end of the investment period. Finan-
cial outcomes are presented as the net present value of profits at the end of the
investment horizon (NPVT ∗) relative to the gross value of the fishery at open ac-
cess (ρY0). Environmental outcomes are measured as stock size at the end of the
investment period (Xt) relative to stock at maximum sustainable yield (XMSY ).
Social outcomes are measured by the number of vessels operating at the end of the
investment period (vT ∗)relative to the number of vessels operating at open access
(v0).
Table 4.1: Model Results
Financial/Econ.
Outcomes
Environmental
Outcomes
Social
Outcomes
Measure NPVT ∗/ρY0 XT ∗/XMSY vT ∗/v0
Intervention 1: Increase in Post-Harvest Value
Open Access 0.676 0.461 1.109
Intervention 2: Optimal Management Reform
Input 1.904 1.236 0.357
Output 1.571 1.268 0.538
DAPS 2.150 1.240 0.581
Intervention 3: Gradual Reform with Endogenous Price
Input 1.671 1.100 0.313
Output 1.156 1.080 0.500
DAPS 1.875 1.080 0.639
Interventions 2 and 3 generate significant profits by the end of the investment
period. The net present value of these profits range from 1.2-2.2 times the gross
value of the fishery at open access. Interventions 2 and 3 also generate positive
environmental outcomes, with each management strategy producing fish stocks at
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Figure 4.1: Profits as Percentage of Gross Value at Open Access
or above stock size at maximum sustainable yield. This is significant because it
indicates that a recovering fishery can generate value within a reasonable invest-
ment horizon as long as effective governance is in place. This stands in contrast to
Intervention 1. Under open access, the fishery generates some value (0.676 times
gross value) but only at the expense of the environmental health of the fish stock.
Furthermore, profits are only generated during the first eight years of the invest-
ment horizon: By the end of the investment horizon, increases in the number of
vessels operating dissipates any profits generated.
While Interventions 2 and 3 achieve the economic and environmental outcomes,
they also require 34% - 64% decreases in the number of vessels operating. As
a result, they fail to meet the benchmark for social improvement. In contrast,
Intervention 1 leads to 10.9% increase in the number of vessels operating which
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meets the criteria for social improvement. The apparent tradeoff between social
and environmental/financial objectives is also apparent in the optimal approach
paths for Intervention 2, where the optimal solution in each management strategy
for Intervention 2 is the complete closure of the fishery for multiple years. This
represents the fastest possible recovery time for the fish stock but would likely
impose significant costs on the fishing community not adequately captured by
this model. The results from intervention 3 indicate that some of these impacts
can be mitigated through a more moderated recovery path and the addition of a
price premium. By preventing a full closure of the fishery, Intervention 3 takes
a slower recovery trajectory; however at the end of the investment horizon, the
environmental and financial outcomes are similar to those of Intervention 2.
The sensitivity analysis in Appendix B indicates that these results are sensi-
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tive to the biological productivity of the fish stock (σ). In intervention 1, low
productivity stocks generate much larger financial gains than do high productivity
stocks. To some extent, this simply be numerical: All else equal, low productivity
fish stocks under open access support a smaller fleet than do high productivity fish
stocks. A smaller fleet will harvest less than a larger fleet when the capacity of
each vessel is finite. This also means that the smaller fleet can generate less total
revenue and a less valuable fishery. When the value of harvest is increased through
Intervention 1, the percentage increase in profits is, therefore, much larger for low
productivity stocks than for high productivity stocks.
Interventions 2 and 3 are also sensitive to productivity but in the opposite
direction. In Intervention 2, very low productivity stocks produce a fishery closure
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that lasts for the entire investment period. This produces no financial returns for
either fishers or capital providers while the stock size remains below XMSY by the
end of the investment period. Highly productive stocks are also highly profitable,
with financial returns between two and three times gross value at open access.
Although these high productivity stocks also reach a sustainable stock size within
the investment period, the social outcomes are far less sensitive to productivity:
even high productivity stocks require significant reductions in fleet size.
The size of the price premia from Interventions 1 and 3 are also important
to consider. As the price premium from Intervention 1 (θ) increases, financial
outcomes over the course of the investment horizon initially increase but become
negative when θ = 100%. Because vessels enter the fishery at a rate that is
proportionate to profits from fishing, an increasingly large price premium drives
faster fleet growth. A larger fleet generates larger profits initially but also leads to
faster profit dissipation. When premiums are low, the present value of profits over
the investment horizon is positive and large. But at very high premiums, profits
are dissipated too quickly leading to negative financial outcomes. In contrast,
increases in the premium in Intervention 3 (τ) lead directly to increased profits.
Once governance is in place, an increase in the value of fish leads directly into value
for both fishers and capital providers. The environmental and social outcomes,
however, appear invariant to the size of the premium.
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CHAPTER 5
DISCUSSION
The dynamic behaviors displayed by the model have many implications for conser-
vation finance in fisheries. In this section, we focus on three main insights: the role
of fisheries management in supporting conervation finance, the tradeoffs existing
between environmental and social objectives in reforming fisheries at open access,
and the importance of relationships between private, public, and philanthropic
actors to the efficacy of conservation finance for fisheries.
Governance Must be a Priority
Without effective fisheries management, the strategies proposed by the conserva-
tion finance industry will fail to generate lasting value and will not support triple
bottom-line improvements in the fishery. An increase in the value of catch will
increase the value of an open access fishery during th investmeent horizon. But
it will not change the underlying incentives driving fishing behavior. If effective
governance is not in place before a strategy to monetize fishery improvements is
implemented, any short-term profits will eventually be dissipated as new vessels
enter the fishery. This is particularly relevant for project managers seeking to
build relationships with local stakeholders. As described by Sampson et al. [69],
many fisheries improvement projects in developing countries are given access to
higher margin, sustainable seafood markets before making any improvements to
fisheries management. While this might help to foster cooperation between local
stakeholders and project managers, many fisheries retain this market access for
years before making any meaningful changes to the fisheries management process.
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Worse still, projects that ignore governance can generate value and support a
larger number of fishers during the investment horizon while hastening the decline
of the fish stock. Further, low productivity stocks (those that take the longest to
recover), produce the largest short term gains relative to gross value at open access
(Appendix B). With perfect information, this strategy is clearly self-defeating: it
is not the goal of conservation finance to cause further environmental harm. But
in the context of a data poor and economically impoverished fishery, a strategy
that can quickly generate value for both stakeholders and capital providers might
be appealing to project managers attempting to balance profitability, risk, and
triple bottom-line impacts. Existing and proposed fisheries related projects utilize
increases in fisher revenue [27, 82], market premium paid to fishers [27], and the
number of fishers/fishing communities engaged [4, 27, 82] as metrics for social or
economic success, while proposed investment time horizons can be as short as
five years [27]. The strategy modeled in Intervention 1 might reasonably produce
increases in each of these metrics over a short investment horizon, providing quick
improvements in local economic or social conditions, while actually contributing
to declines in the fishery in the long run.
Tradeoffs Across the Triple Bottom-Line
The increase in the number of vessels in Intervention 1 and the decrease in the num-
ber of vessels in Intervnentions 2 and 3 illustrates a tradeoff between environmental
and social objectives. In order to recover a fish stock at the open access equilib-
rium, the models show that it is necessary to reduce aggregate fishing effort. This
result is not impacted by an increase in the price premium in Intervention 3 (Ap-
pendix B). If fishers need to be removed from the fishery, then those fishers must
either enter a new fishery or find a new livelihood altogether. However, this type of
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transition is rarely costless. In cases where fishers have few economic alternatives,
the alternative livelihood approach may not be effective and effort reduction can
project unacceptably high costs on fishing communities [62]. These potential wel-
fare impacts present a challenge for conservation finance. Many practitioners have
followed the broader international community by making strong commitments to
improving environmental outcomes without jeopardizing social conditions. In the
Principles for Investment in Sustainable Wild-Caught Fisheries announced at the
World Ocean Summit 2018, the founding adopters call for both “sustainable man-
agement of targeted fisheries” and projects that “should not have a negative overall
impact on local communities food, nutrition, and livelihood security [28].” These
declarations echo the United Nations Sustainable Development Goals (SDGs) to
“restore fish stocks in the shortest time feasible” (Goal 14.4), while supporting
“inclusive and sustainable economic growth, employment, and decent work for all”
(Goal 8) [84].
Conservation finance can help to reconcile these objectives by supporting new
livelihoods for fishers that provide income without causing significant social or
cultural disruption. Some fishery improvement projects have proposed voluntary
fishing gear buy-back programs to compel fishers to exit the fishery [27,57]. Though
not always successful, conservation finance and related improvement projects have
worked to transition fishers to new industries such as aquaculture and ecotourism
[57,82].
The “shortest time feasible” described by the SDGs might imply a long-term
closure that would certainly have impacts on the livelihoods of coastal communi-
ties with few alternatives. The results of Intervention 3, however, indicate that
slower recovery strategies can be effective at generating significant financial returns
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without closing the fishery altogether. Although Intervention 3 still requires a re-
duction in fishing effort, the more moderate recovery can provide many important
benefits such as retaining expertise and malleable capital in the harvesting and
processing sectors, maintaining local seafood markets, and reducing the costs of
any alternative livelihood strategy [46]. Although the model indicates that Inter-
vention 2 is more efficient, Intervention 3 might be more realistic while providing
additional benefits not adequately captured by the model.
Partnerships and Capital Structure
The focus on management and alternative livelihood strategies in the context o
stoks that might take years to recover suggest that the success of conservation
finance will depend upon continued partnerships between private capital providers
and public entities, NGOs, and multilateral institutions. These organizations cur-
rently provide most of the technical support (operational assistance, monitoring,
training) as well much of the capital (philanthropic and concessionary) to facilitate
fisheries management reform. Private capital providers are not likely to assume
these roles. Instead, the private sector offers an additional source of capital that
can help to expand current fisheries reform efforts [85].
These partnerships will also be important as the conservation finance industry
seeks strategies to increase the scale of impact and capital provided. Currently,
conservation finance for fisheries has attracted relatively small, impact-focused,
specialized investment funds. In order to attract capital at a larger scale, conser-
vation finance strategies must be either scalable or easily replicable across different
fisheries [85]. Although investment in improvements to a fishery supply chain may
be easily replicable, fisheries management reform and alternative livelihood strate-
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gies are not. They are regionally specific and, as stated above, require assistance
and oversight from public entities, NGOs, or multilateral institutions. Thus, the
rate at which effective strategies for conservation finance for fisheries can expand
is limited by the resources of these organizations.
Biological characteristics might also become relevant to the allocation of cap-
ital. Low productivity fish stocks generate value much more slowly than do high
productivity stocks. It might, therefore, be easier to attract return-seeking capital
providers to highly productive fish stocks as they are able to produce significant
returns within a reasonable investment horizon. On the other hand, conservation
finance may be less suited to supporting interventions in slow-growing, collapsed
fisheries. In these cases, public entities, NGOs, and foundations are likely to con-
tinue to shoulder most of the financial costs associated with reform before they are
able to attract private capital.
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CHAPTER 6
CONCLUSION
The purpose of this paper is to analyze the challenges and opportunities facing
conservation finance to support sustainable fisheries. Illustrating the need for
new sources of capital to fund sustainable fisheries management, we identify three
strategies proposed by the conservation finance industry for generating value and
define appropriate measures for financial performance and triple-bottom line im-
pact. Using open access fisheries as motivating context, we simulate each inter-
vention using a bioeconomic model of a single-species fishery and evaluate the
performance and impact of each intervention at the end a relevant investment
period.
We find that strategies which do not reform fisheries management are able to
generate positive profits with a ten year present value of 0.676 times the gross value
of the fishery at open access while supporting a 10.9% increase in the number of
fishers operating. These gains, however, fail to restore the fish stock to sustainable
levels. Interventions which focus on management reform are able to generate profits
with a ten year present value between 1.1 and 2.1 times gross value at open access
while, in all cases, restoring the fish stock to sustainable levels. These strategies
require a 34% to 64% decrease in the number of vessels operating.
The model results suggest that some conservation finance strategies are effec-
tive at generating value as well as producing positive economic and environmental
outcomes; but effective fisheries governance is key to generating value and for sus-
tainable improvements in the conditions of the fishery. Conservation finance in
fisheries without effective governance face a perverse incentive in which short term
financial gains and increased employment can lead to further degradation of the
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fish stock. Our findings illustrate a broader tradeoff between environmental and
social goals present in conservation finance for open access fisheries: In order to
improve the health of the fish stock operating at open access, fishing effort must
be reduced. A key role for conservation finance will be to help support sustainable
and profitable alternative livelihoods for fishers displaced by conservation efforts.
Furthermore, financial returns are sensitive to stock productivity. This may be
an important barrier in matching conservation needs with return-seeking capital.
These results are the first attempt to use some of the conventional tools from fish-
eries economics to inform the development of the burgeoning conservation finance.
In identifying these key challenges, we hope to inform the agenda of the broader
sustainable development community.
Although a simple model can illustrate the most important dynamics in a
fishery, there are several areas where future research can build upon the current
analysis. The current model parameters illustrate a representative fishery, future
work could map these results onto existing fisheries to estimate the true value
of potential conservation finance deals. In addition, many of the interventions
proposed by the conservation finance industry focus on increasing market value
through investments in the seafood supply chain. The current model focuses only
on the harvesting sector and does not capture the value generated by these down-
stream firms. Future work should also focus on new ways to consider evaluate
triple-bottom line impacts. The simple measures used in this paper provide only
the most basic insights into the economic, environmental, and social conditions of
the fishery. A more nuanced view would greatly improve our understanding of the
opportunities and tradeoffs associated with conservation finance.
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APPENDIX A
MODEL SPECIFICATIONS
A.1 Open Access Dynamics and Equilibrium
We utilize a discrete-time model of a single fish stock that is exploited by homoge-
nous fishers over time (t), where t represents years. Over time, model dynamics
are determined by a range of endogenous variables (represented by English let-
ters) and exogenous parameters (Greek letters). All parameter values are defined
in Table (). The model will then determine the harvest and effort combination
that maximizes the discounted value of the net economic benefits associated with
harvesting activities.
The biological component of the model is built upon Schaefer’s model [71] for
logistic growth.
F (Xt) = σXt
(
1− Xt
κ
)
(A.1)
where σ =growth rate, κ =carrying capacity. This model generates the key bi-
ological dynamic of interest - density dependent growth. In each time period,
harvesting effort is applied to the fish stock. Assuming that the initial stock size
(Xt=0) is known, the model is advanced over time according to the following re-
cursive equation:
Xt+1 = Xt + F (Xt)− Y (Xt, Et) (A.2)
where Y (Xt) =harvest as a function of stock size and fishing effort (Et). Y (Xt)
serves as the production function for the fishery and assumes that catch-per-unit-
effort is proportional to stock size:
Y (Xt, Et) = γXtEt (A.3)
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where γ is a constant parameter.
Following Anderson & Seijo [8], we disaggregate annual effort (Et) to the level
of individual vessels:
Et = δvtft (A.4)
where δ = the number of days fished per year, vt = the number of vessels operating
in the fishery in year t, and ft = the amount of effort produced each day by each
vessel in year t. It is assumed that each vessel and vessel owner is identical face
the following annual cost function:
ct = δ[αft + βf
2
t ] + Φ (A.5)
where α and β are constants and Φ represents the fixed costs of effort [16]. In
order to simulate economic decision making in the fishery, we also must assume
that vessel owners/operators are also seeking to maximize profit. The vessel-level
profit function is determined by transforming equation A.4 and subtracting the
annual cost function
NRt = ρδγXtft − δ(αft + βf 2t )− Φ (A.6)
where ρ = ex-vessel price.
Under open access (i.e. no management), there are no restrictions on the
operators except the technical limitations of the gear and the marginal costs of
fishing effort. The economic model will achieve an equilibrium when total revenue
is equal to total profit. Dropping the time subscripts for a moment, for E > 0,
ργXE = cvE (A.7)
X =
cv
ργ
(A.8)
X =
v(δ[αft + βf
2
t ] + Φ)
ργ
(A.9)
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This gives the combinations of effort and stock size that will produce an economic
equilibrium; but to fit the disaggregate model above, we also need to account for
the profit-maximizing behavior or individual vessels. In any given year, a profit
maximizing vessel will operate where marginal revenues are equal to marginal costs:
ργXt = α + 2βft (A.10)
Solving for the profit-maximizing level of daily effort,
f ∗t =
ργXt − α
2γ
(A.11)
For positive parameter values, f ∗ is an increasing function of stock size. It is
not reasonable to allow fishing capital be infinitely productive [8]. Therefore, we
assume that daily effort is bounded above at fMAX and below by 0. Economic
theory suggests that, in the long run, a firm will eventually reach an equilibrium
where marginal revenue is equal to both the marginal cost and the minimum of
average cost of fishing. We can solve for the equilibrium daily fishing effort that
occurs at this point by setting equation A.10 equal to the average cost of fishing
in a given season:
α + 2βft = α + βft +
Φ
ftδ
(A.12)
fmin =
√
Φ
δβ
(A.13)
For an economic system to reach equilibrium, the total revenues must equal the
total costs. Substituting equation A.13 into A.12, the stock size at the open access
equilibrium is
XOA =
α + βfmin +
Φ
fminδ
ργ
(A.14)
supporting vessels defined by
vOA =
F (XOA)
δfminγXOA
(A.15)
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A final consideration for the model is the advancement of effort over time when
there is no management in place. We model vessel entry and exit decisions such
that changes in effort will be proportional to net returns per vessel:
vt+1 = vt + φNRt (A.16)
where φ =constant entry-exit parameter.
A.2 Maximum Sustainable Yield
We will derive the maximum sustainable yield using the aggregated model. A ‘sus-
tainable’ yield occurs when the current harvest rate equals to the natural growth
of the stock and can be maintained indefinitely.
Xt+1 −Xt = F (Xt)− Y (Xt, Et) = 0 (A.17)
This relationship is a function of Et: there is a sustainable yield for any level of
aggregate fishing effort. Any sustainable yield must satisfy
F (Xt) = Y (Xt, Et) (A.18)
Substituting in equations A.1 and A.3 and solving for Xt:
σXt
(
1− Xt
κ
)
= γXtEt (A.19)
Xt = k −
(
γκEt
σ
)
(A.20)
Equation A.20 can then be substituted into A.3 to obtain a function for sustainable
yield as a function of effort:
Yt = γκEt
(
1− γEt
σ
)
(A.21)
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For a given κ, γ, σ > 0 and E < r/q, this relationship is smooth, differentiable,
and has a unique,non-zero maximum (YMSY ):
dYt
dEt
= γκ− 2Etγ
2κ
σ
= 0 (A.22)
Solving for E and Y :
EMSY =
σ
2γ
(A.23)
YMSY =
κσ
4
(A.24)
And solving for stock size at MSY:
XMSY =
κ
2
(A.25)
A.3 Optimal Input Constraints
In this model, utilized in both Interventions 2 and 3, total fishing effort is con-
strained by limiting the number of vessels that can participate in fishery. If the
total amount of effort in year t is set exogenously, the number of vessels in the
fishery is now determined by
vt =
Et
δf ∗t
(A.26)
The target total effort is determined by solving for the optimal by solving the
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following maximization problem:
max
{Et}
T∑
t=0
(
1
1 + i
)t
NRtvt
subject to Xt+1 = Xt + F (Xt)− Y (Xt, Et), ∀ t ∈ T.
vt =
Et
δf ∗t
, ∀ t ∈ T.
0 ≤ Et ≤ EMSY , ∀ t ∈ T
X0 ≤ Xt, ∀ t ∈ T
X0, Y0, v0 given
(A.27)
When the endogenous price premium is introduced in Intervention 3, the following
constraint is added to the optimization problem.
Pt =

ρ Xt < XMSY
ρ(1 + τ) Xt ≥ XMSY
(A.28)
Where XMSY is the stock size at maximum sustainable yield (derived in Appendix
B) and τ > 0.
A.4 Optimal Output Constraints
This model, used in interventions 2 and 3, considers the implementation of a sea-
sonal harvest constraint or Total Allowable Catch (TAC). The intuition is simple:
before the start of each fishing season, the TAC is determined based upon the
estimated stock size. Fishing proceeds throughout the season until the aggregate
catch reaches the TAC, after which, the fishery is closed for the remainder of the
season. Instead of remaining fixed, the length of the season is now an endogenous
variable in the model and is a function of stock size and the number of vessels.
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The number of vessels is determined before the start of the season and remains
fixed through the season according to
vt =
Y TACt
γδXtf ∗t
(A.29)
If we assume that each vessel is operating at a profit maximizing level of effort,
then, we can solve for the length of the season δt (the length of the season is now
endogenous):
dt =
Y TACt
γXtvtf ∗
(A.30)
The season length now becomes becomes endogenous to the system. The TAC for
each year (Y TACt ) can now be determined through by the following optimization
problem:
max
{Y TACt }
T∑
t=0
(
1
1 + i
)t
NRtvt
subject to Xt+1 = Xt + F (Xt)− Y TAC(Xt, Et), ∀ t ∈ T.
vt =
Y TACt
γδXtf ∗t
dt =
Y TACt
γXtvtf ∗t
0 ≤ Y TACt ≤ YMSY , ∀ t ∈ T
X0 ≤ Xt, ∀ t ∈ T
X0, Y0, v0 given
(A.31)
When the price premium is introduced to the system, the following constraint is
added to the optimization problem.
Pt =

ρ Xt < X
MSY
ρ(1 + τ) Xt ≥ XMSY
(A.32)
Where XMSY , the stock size at maximum sustainable yield, is defined in Appendix
2 and τ > 0.
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A.5 Dedicated Access Permits
There are a few key differences between a simple output constraint and transferable
quotas. Unlike the output constraints described in the previous section, we assume
that each permit operator is guaranteed a share of the harvest. This eliminates
the ’race’ to fish and allows us to reset the season length as an exogenous variable.
The number of vessels that can be supported at a given level of harvest is therefore
determined by:
vt =
Y DAPt
γδXtfmin
(A.33)
We now assume that the profit maximizing daily effort decision, fDAPt , now
corresponds to the minimum of the average total costs. The quota system com-
pels fishers to operate at the minimum of the average total costs (assuming zero
transaction costs)
max
{Y DAPt }
T∑
t=0
(
1
1 + i
)t
NRtvt
subject to Xt+1 = Xt + F (Xt)− Y DAP (Xt, Et), ∀ t ∈ T.
vt =
Y DAPt
γδXtfmin
0 ≤ Y DAPt ≤ YMSY
ft = fmin ∀ t ∈ T
X0 ≤ Xt, ∀ t ∈ T
X0, Y0, v0 given
(A.34)
When the price premium is introduced to the system, the following constraint is
added to the optimization problem.
Pt =

ρ Xt < XMSY
ρ(1 + τ) Xt ≥ XMSY
(A.35)
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APPENDIX B
SENSITIVITY ANALYSIS
Stock Productivity: σ
Table B.1: Sensitivity of Financial/Economic Outcomes (σ)
σ = 0.05 σ = 0.10 σ = 0.30 σ = 0.50
Intervention 1: Increase in Post-Harvest Value
Open Access 1.411 1.036 0.676 0.588
Intervention 2: Optimal Management Reform
Input 0.000 0.000 1.904 3.324
Output 0.000 0.000 1.571 3.120
DAPS 0.000 0.522 2.150 3.442
Intervention 3: Gradual Reform with Endogenous Price
Input 0.261 0.497 1.671 2.708
Output 0.131 0.262 1.156 2.339
DAPS 0.168 0.524 1.875 2.687
Table B.2: Sensitivity of Environmental Outcomes (σ)
σ = 0.05 σ = 0.10 σ = 0.30 σ = 0.50
Intervention 1: Increase in Post-Harvest Value
Open Access 0.438 0.443 0.461 0.479
Intervention 2: Optimal Management Reform
Input 0.789 1.007 1.236 1.492
Output 0.789 1.007 1.268 1.255
DAPS 0.789 0.933 1.240 1.548
Intervention 3: Gradual Reform with Endogenous Price
Input 0.686 0.783 1.100 1.535
Output 0.682 0.775 1.080 1.226
DAPS 0.663 0.775 1.068 1.423
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Table B.3: Sensitivity of Social Outcomes (σ)
σ = 0.05 σ = 0.10 σ = 0.30 σ = 0.50
Intervention 1: Increase in Post-Harvest Value
Open Access 2.081 1.46 1.109 1.057
Intervention 2: Optimal Management Reform
Input 0.000 0.000 0.357 0.214
Output 0.000 0.000 0.538 0.534
DAPS 0.000 0.470 0.581 0.598
Intervention 3: Gradual Reform with Endogenous Price
Input 0.415 0.354 0.313 0.207
Output 0.500 0.500 0.500 0.547
DAPS 0.501 0.500 0.639 0.627
Price Premia: θ, τ
Table B.4: Sensitivity of Financial Outcomes (θ)
θ = 10% θ = 25% θ = 50% θ = 100%
Intervention 1: Increase in Post-Harvest Value
Open Access 0.372 0.676 1.537 -0.263
Table B.5: Sensitivity of Environmental Outcomes (θ)
θ = 10% θ = 25% θ = 50% θ = 100%
Intervention 1: Increase in Post-Harvest Value
Open Access 0.534 0.461 0.381 0.262
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Table B.6: Sensitivity of Social Outcomes (θ)
θ = 10% θ = 25% θ = 50% θ = 100%
Intervention 1: Increase in Post-Harvest Value
Open Access 1.047 1.109 1.201 1.424
Table B.7: Sensitivity of Financial Outcomes (τ)
τ = 8% τ = 18% τ = 28% τ = 38%
Intervention 3: Gradual Reform with Endogenous Price
Input 1.511 1.671 1.832 1.992
Output 0.979 1.156 1.187 1.290
DAPS 1.567 1.875 1.885 2.097
Table B.8: Sensitivity of Environmental Outcomes (τ)
τ = 8% τ = 18% τ = 28% τ = 38%
Intervention 3: Gradual Reform with Endogenous Price
Input 1.100 1.100 1.100 1.100
Output 1.080 1.080 1.080 1.080
DAPS 1.080 1.080 1.080 1.055
Table B.9: Sensitivity of Social Outcomes (τ)
τ = 8% τ = 18% τ = 28% τ = 38%
Intervention 3: Gradual Reform with Endogenous Price
Input 0.313 0.313 0.313 0.313
Output 0.500 0.500 0.500 0.500
DAPS 0.500 0.527 0.639 0.666
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